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Abstract. We revisit the classic comparison between Bertrand and Cournot out-
comes in a mixed market with private and public rms. A departure from the
standard setting, i.e., one where all rms maximize prots, provides new insights.
A welfare-maximizing public rm's price is strictly lower while its output is strictly
higher in Cournot competition. And whereas the private rm's quantity is strictly
lower in Cournot (as in the standard setting), its price can be higher or lower.
Despite this ambiguity, both rms, public and private, earn strictly lower prots
in Cournot. The consumer surplus is strictly higher in Cournot under a linear de-
mand structure. All these results also hold with more than two rms under a wide
range of parameterizations. The ranking reversals also hold in a richer setting with
a partially privatized public rm, where the extent of privatization is endogenously
determined by a welfare-maximizing government. As a by-product of our analy-
sis, we nd that in a dierentiated duopoly setting, partial privatization always
improves welfare in Cournot but not necessarily in Bertrand competition.
JEL classication numbers: L13, H42
Keywords: Bertrand, Cournot, public rms, partial privatization
1. Introduction
It is now well known that Bertrand competition yields lower prices and prots and
higher quantities, consumer surplus, and welfare than Cournot competition (see, for ex-
ample, Singh and Vives [19], Cheng [4], Vives [22], and Okuguchi [16]). Subsequently,
exploiting cost asymmetries, Dastidar [6], Qiu [17], H ackner [12], and Amir and Jin [1]
have provided important counterexamples where at least one of these conclusions fails to
hold. To date, however, the literature comparing Bertrand and Cournot outcomes has fo-
cused almost exclusively on environments where all rms maximize prots. We revisit this
classic comparison, but in mixed markets, where prot-maximizing private rms coexist
with public rms.
This coexistence is observed in several oligopolistic sectors including banking, insurance,
telecommunications, and postal services in Europe, Canada, and Japan. In the United
States, both public and private rms coexist in the packaging and overnight delivery
Date: September 15, 2008.
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industries (Matsumura and Matsushima [15]). While in the developed countries public
rms are primarily present in the services and utilities sector, in the developing world
their presence is pervasive. In developing countries, the share of public enterprises in
manufacturing output and employment lies in the 30-70% range (Schmitz [18]).
So, how does a public rm dier from its private counterpart? We follow the mixed
oligopoly literature in assuming that the dierence lies in the objective function. Unlike
private rms, which maximize prots, a public rm maximizes welfare (sum of consumer
surplus and prots).
1 We characterize and compare Cournot and Bertrand outcomes in a
dierentiated duopoly where a private rm competes against a welfare maximizing public
rm (sections 2 and 3). The results are often strikingly dierent from the ones obtained
in the standard setting which has only prot-maximizing rms.
In the standard setting the equilibrium prices are strictly higher in Cournot. In contrast,
we nd that the welfare-maximizing public rm's price is strictly lower in Cournot than
in Bertrand competition while the private rm's price can be higher or lower in Cournot.
Despite the ambiguity in price ordering between Bertrand and Cournot for the private
rm's price, comparison of quantities and prots (between the two) gives unambiguous
results. The public rm's quantity is strictly higher in Cournot whereas the private rm's
output, as Singh and Vives [19] show, is strictly lower. We nd that, contrary to standard
ndings, both rms' prots are strictly lower in Cournot. All these results hold under
general utility specications satisfying standard assumptions used in the literature. We
also nd general suciency conditions under which consumer surplus is strictly higher
and welfare is strictly lower under Cournot. Using these suciency results we show that
for linear demand structure used in Singh and Vives [19], consumer surplus (welfare) is
indeed strictly higher (lower) under Cournot. These results hold for more than two rms
under a range of parameter values.
Comparison of Bertrand and Cournot outcomes is of fundamental importance in the
industrial organization literature. The paper contributes to this literature by conduct-
ing the classic comparison in a richer setting where all rms do not necessarily maximize
prots. As the results (mentioned above) suggest, the departure from the standard set-
ting provide new insights. In addition, the paper draws from as well as contributes to
the public economics literature on mixed oligopoly which examines the incentives and
welfare consequences of maintaining/privatizing a public rm. While both modes of mar-
ket competition, Cournot and Bertrand, have been employed in this literature to analyze
privatization|see for example, De Fraja and Delbono [7], Matsumura [14] for Cournot
analysis, and Cremer et. al. [5] and Anderson et al. [2], for Bertrand analysis|there
1See De Fraja and Delbono [8] and Basu [3, Ch.16] for surveys on mixed oligopoly. Also, see De Fraja and
Delbono [7] and Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse [2] for a critical discussion on welfare maximization as
an objective of public 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does not exist any systematic comparison between the two. The paper lls this gap. More
importantly, the paper shows that in mixed oligopolies, the standard Bertrand-Cournot
rankings obtained from an oligopoly analysis with prot-maximizing rms no longer hold.
In section 4, we relax the assumption that the public rms maximize welfare. We re-
examine the comparison (between Bertrand and Cournot outcomes) in an environment
with possible partial privatization of the public rm. In particular, we endogenize the
degree of privatization by constructing a stylized two-stage game in which a public rm
maximizes a weighted sum of its own prots and welfare in stage two, and the weights,
indicating the extent of privatization, are chosen optimally by a welfare-maximizing gov-
ernment in stage one. The reversals also hold under this richer setting. As a by-product
of our analysis, we nd that the mode of market competition (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot)
can have qualitatively dierent welfare implications for partial privatization.
2. The Basic Model
Consider an economy with two sectors: a competitive sector producing the numeraire
good y and an imperfectly competitive sector with two rms, rm 1 and rm 2, each pro-
ducing a dierentiated good. Let pi and qi denote rm i's price and quantity respectively,
where i = 1;2. The representative consumer maximizes V (q;y)  U(q) + y subject to
p1q1 + p2q2 + y  I where q  (q1;q2) 2 <2
+ and I denotes income. The utility function
U(q) is continuously dierentiable as often as required on <2
+. Furthermore, the following
holds:
Assumption 1. For i;j 2 f1;2g, i 6= j, (i) Ui(q) 
@U(q)





@qi@qj < 0, (iv) Uij(q) = Uji(q), and (v) jUii(q)j > jUij(q)j.
These assumptions are standard in the literature (see, for example, section 5 in Singh and
Vives [19]).
Since V (q;y) is separable and linear in y, there are no income eects, and consequently,
for a large enough income, the representative consumer's optimization problem is reduced
to choosing q to maximize U(q)   p1q1   p2q2. Utility maximization yields the inverse
demands: pi =
@U(q)
@qi  Pi(q) for qi > 0, i = 1;2. Then, applying Assumption 1 gives two
important properties: (a) demand slopes downward, since
@Pi(q)
@qi  Uii(q) < 0, and (b)
two goods are substitutes, since
@Pi(q)
@qj  Uij(q) < 0, (i 6= j).
Inverting the inverse demand system yields the direct demands: qi = Di(p) where
i = 1;2 and p = (p1;p2) 2 <2














where i;j 2 f1;2g, i 6= j and Uij, Uii are evaluated at q = (q1;q2)  (D1(p);D2(p)).4 ARGHYA GHOSH AND MANIPUSHPAK MITRA
There are no xed costs. Each rm has a constant marginal cost m > 0. We assume that
unit costs are constant and symmetric for the public and private rm in order to highlight
our source of reversal: the presence of public rms.2 Qualitatively, all our propositions
hold under asymmetric costs.
Firm 2 maximizes prot and we refer to rm 2 as the private rm. Firm 1 is a public
sector enterprise, or, in short, a public rm. Following the mixed oligopoly literature, we
assume that the public rm maximizes welfare. Prots and welfare, in terms of q and p,
are precisely dened below.
2.1. Cournot competition. Corresponding to a quantity vector q  (q1;q2), prots of
rm i, denoted by i(q), and welfare, denoted by W(q), are:
i(q) = (pi(q)   m)qi;
W(q) = U(q)   m(q1 + q2):




= Uii < 0,
@2W(q)







@qi@qj j. We also make the following assumptions which are standard in the
oligopoly literature.
Assumption 2. For i;j 2 f1;2g, i 6= j, we have (i)
@2i(q)












Assumption 2(i) says that quantities are strategic substitutes. Assumption 2 (ii) says that

























> 0 which is sucient
for the uniqueness of the Cournot solution in our set up.
A quantity vector qC  (qC
1;qC
2) is a Cournot equilibrium if and only if W(qC) 
W(q1;qC
2) for all q1 6= qC
1 and 2(qC)  2(qC
1;q2) for all q2 6= qC
2. Corresponding to a















i , CSC, and WC respectively are rm i's price, rm i's prots, consumer
surplus, and welfare in Cournot equilibrium.
2See Matsumura and Matsushima [15] for an analysis of privatization under endogenous cost dierences.COMPARING BERTRAND AND COURNOT OUTCOMES 5
2.2. Bertrand competition. Corresponding to a price vector p  (p1;p2), prots of rm
i, denoted by ~ i(p), and welfare, denoted by ~ W(p), are:
~ i(p) = (pi   m)Di(p);
~ W(p) = U(D1(p);D2(p))   m(D1(p) + D2(p)):
We assume that p1 and p2 are strategic complements. More formally, the following
holds:
Assumption 3. For i;j 2 f1;2g, i 6= j, we have (i)
@2 ~ W(p)
@pi@pj > 0, (ii)
@2~ i(p)



















Strategic complementarity (of prices) is a standard assumption in a dierentiated Bertrand
duopoly with prot-maximizing rms. Assumption 3 (i) and (ii) states that strategic com-
plementarity holds even when one rm maximizes welfare. Assumption 3 guarantees the
uniqueness of the Bertrand equilibrium.
Assumptions 2 and 3 hold for the standard quadratic utility specication considered
in the literature (see, for example, Dixit [9], Singh and Vives [19], Qiu [17], and H ackner
[12]).
A price vector pB  (pB
1;pB
2) is a Bertrand equilibrium if and only if ~ W(pB)  ~ W(p1;pB
2)
for all p1 6= pB
1 and ~ 2(pB)  ~ 2(pB
1;p2) for all p2 6= pB
2. Corresponding to a Bertrand




i = ~ i(pB)  i(qB);










i , CSB, and WB respectively are rm i's price, rm i's prots, consumer
surplus, and welfare in Bertrand equilibrium.
3. Comparing Bertrand and Cournot Outcomes
Before we start comparing Bertrand and Cournot outcomes we introduce a technical
lemma that will be used in proving the results of this section.
Lemma 1. Consider any dierentiable function f : <2
+ ! <. Dene a(t) = ta0+(1 t)a00 2
<2
+ where a0  (a0
1;a0
2) and a00  (a00
1;a00
2) 2 <2
+ and t 2 [0;1]. For all such a0;a00 2 <2
+,











































t=0 d[f(a(t))] = f(a(1))   f(a(0)) =
f(a0)   f(a00). 
3.1. Prices. First we compare the pricing of the public rm under Cournot and Bertrand
competition. In a dierentiated duopoly with prot-maximizing rms only, equilibrium
prices are higher under Cournot competition (Singh and Vives [19]; Vives[22]). Theorem 1
shows that the conclusion does not hold in the presence of a public rm. The public rm's
price is strictly lower under Cournot competition irrespective of demand specication.
Theorem 1. Suppose qC
i > 0 and qB
i > 0 for i = 1;2. Then pB
1 > pC
1 = m.
Proof: Under Cournot competition, q1 = qC
1 maximizes W(q1;qC
2). Since qC
i > 0, from






  m = 0:
We have
@U(qC)
@q1  P1(qC) and by denition, pC
1 = P1(qC). Thus pC
1 = m.
Noting that pB = (pB
1;pB



















+ D2(pB) = 0: (4)
From (1), we have (i)
@D1(pB)
@p1 < 0 and (ii)
@D2(pB)
@p1 > 0. Since
@D2(pB)
@p2 < 0 and D2(pB) =
qB
2 > 0, from (4) it follows that (iii) pB
2   m > 0. Together with (i)|(iii), equation (3)
implies that pB
1   m > 0. 
To understand Theorem 1, consider an innitesimally small increase in p1 from p1 = m.
This reduces the public rm's output, q1, and raises the private rm's output, q2. The
welfare loss from the reduction in q1 is second order while the welfare gain from an increase
in q2 is rst order (since pB
2 > m). This logic implies that if the two goods are substitutes,
and rms compete in prices, a welfare-maximizing public rm will set its price strictly
higher than marginal cost. Thus pB
1 > m. Such considerations are absent in Cournot
competition. Under Cournot conjecture, the welfare maximizing public rm chooses its
own output, taking the private rm's output as given. Thus, the public rm behaves like







2 can be lower or higher than pB
2. On the one hand, as in the standard
setting, the perceived elasticity of demand of a rm is smaller under the Cournot conjectureCOMPARING BERTRAND AND COURNOT OUTCOMES 7
which raises pC
2.3 On the other hand, a lower pC
1 (compared to pB
1) in our framework creates
a downward pressure on the private rm's price, which lowers pC
2. As we will see later, for
the linear demand system, these two eects exactly oset each other, which in turn yields
pC
2 = pB
2. However, in general, the overall eect is ambiguous and the precise comparison
of private prices between the two (Cournot and Bertrand) depends on the demand system.
3.2. Quantities. Surprisingly, despite the ambiguity that pC
2 can be lower or higher than
pB
2, the ranking of quantities is unambiguous. The public rm's quantity is strictly higher
under Cournot while the private rm's quantity is strictly higher under Bertrand. Thus,
the standard quantity ranking is reversed for the public rm but not for the private rm.
See Theorem 2 below.









@q2 = 0, and the sign of second partials of W(:) and 2(:), we prove the
theorem.
Theorem 2. Suppose qC
i > 0 and qB









@q2 at q = (qB
1 ;qB













































3See Proposition 6.1 in Vives [23] for a comparison of elasticities under Bertrand and Cournot.8 ARGHYA GHOSH AND MANIPUSHPAK MITRA







































































Using these signs and that
@W(qB)
@q1 > 0 and
@2(qB)
@q2 < 0, it is straightforward to show that














































































 1 if x < 0
0 if x = 0
1 if x > 0:COMPARING BERTRAND AND COURNOT OUTCOMES 9






@q1@q2 j (which follows from Assumption






@q1@q2 j. Hence the only possibility is
(b). 
3.3. Prots, Consumer Surplus, and Welfare: Equipped with ndings from Theo-
rems 1 and 2, we are now ready to compare Bertrand and Cournot for consumer surplus,
prots, and welfare. In a standard dierentiated duopoly setting, Cournot competition
yields higher prots, lower consumer surplus, and lower welfare compared to Bertrand
competition.
Part (A) of Theorem 3 below states that both rms earn strictly higher prots under
Bertrand competition. Thus, compared to Singh and Vives [19], we have a reversal in
prot rankings for both rms. Claims regarding consumer surplus and welfare, made in
parts (B) and (C) respectively, are contingent on the Bertrand-Cournot ranking of the
public rm's price. While (B) is relatively straightforward, (C) is subtle.
Theorem 3. Suppose qB
i > 0 and qC
i > 0 for i = 1;2. Then we have the following results.
(A) B
i > C
i for i = 1;2.
(B) If pC
2  pB
2 then CSB < CSC.
(C) If pC
2  pB
2 then WB > WC.
Proof: We prove each part separately.
Proof of Part (A): First consider B
1 and C
1. Since pC
1 = m, C
1 = 0. Also, since pB
1 > m
and qB
1 > 0, we have B
1 > 0 = C
1. Next, consider B
2 and C
2. Note that B
2  ~ 2(pB) and
C
2  2(qC) = ~ 2(pC). By writing
B
2   C
2 = [~ 2(pB)   ~ 2(pB
1;pC
2)] + [~ 2(pB
1;pC
2)   ~ 2(pC)];


















From the denition of Bertrand equilibrium it follows that (i) ~ 2(pB)  ~ 2(pB
1;pC
2). By
Theorem 1, (ii) pB
1 > pC







@p1(t) > 0 since
pB
2  m > 0 and
@D2(p1(t);pC
2)
@p1(t) > 0 (see equation 1). Using (i)|(iii) in (8) we get B
2 > C
2.
Proof of Part (B): From Theorem 1 we know pC
1 < pB
1. Moreover, if pC
2  pB
2 then
it is straightforward to show CSB < CSC using Lemma 1 for the function ~ CS(p) (by
considering the price vectors pB and pC) and by noting that
@ ~ CS(p)
@pi < 0 for all i = 1;2.10 ARGHYA GHOSH AND MANIPUSHPAK MITRA
Proof of Part (C): Note that WB  ~ W(pB) and WC  W(qC) = ~ W(pC). By writing
WB   WC =
h








2)   ~ W(pC)
i
;
and then using Lemma 1 we get












1(> m) is the best response to pB
2 and pC
1(= m) is not, we have that ~ W(pB) >
~ W(pC
1;pB


















where the second equality follows from using pC
1 = m and the inequality follows from
applying (1) and the fact that p2(t)  minfp2(1);p2(0)g  minfpB
2;pC










@p2(t) dt > 0, which, together with ~ W(pB) > ~ W(pC
1;pB
2),
gives the result. 
Theorem 3 has three parts. Part (A) shows an unambiguous prot ranking of each
rm under Bertrand and Cournot outcomes. From the price ranking for the public rm
(pB
1 > pC
1 = m) it is obvious that B
1 > C
1. Surprisingly, despite the ambiguity in ranking
between pB
2 and pC
2, we get B
2 > C
2. We show this by making use of (i) the Nash





@p1(t) > 0. Neither (i) nor
(ii) depend on the sign of pB
2   pC
2. Theorem 3 (B) is easy to understand. Theorem 3 (C)
states that if the private rm's price in Cournot is at least as high as that in Bertrand,
then welfare reversal cannot occur. This is a strong result since one would expect that if
pC
1 < pB
1 (as in Theorem 1) and pC
2  pB
2, then there is a possibility of welfare reversal.
Theorem 3 (C) rules out such a possibility.
Remark 1. The results obtained in Theorem 3 are not necessarily restricted to a duopoly.
Consider, for example, the welfare comparison in part (C). In particular, let us consider
a n( 2)-rm oligopoly with n1 public rms and n2( n   n1) private rms. Assume
1  n1 < n. Label these rms from 1 to n such that rms labeled 1 to n1 are public while
rms labeled n1+1 to n are private. Let G1 = f1;2;:::;n1g and G2 = fn1+1;n1+2;:::;ng
denote the group of public rms and the group of private rms respectively. Assume that
an interior Bertrand equilibrium exists. Then there exists a Bertrand equilibrium with
the following property: pB
i = pB
1 if i 2 G1, and pB
i = pB
2 if i 2 G2. Similarly, an interior
Cournot equilibrium exists in which the following holds: pC
i = m if i 2 G1, and pC
i = pC
2 ifCOMPARING BERTRAND AND COURNOT OUTCOMES 11
i 2 G2. Then we nd: pC
2  pB




@pj < 0 for all i 2 G2,
where m is a n1-element vector with all elements m and p is a n2-element vector with
all elements p. Similar conditions are invoked in the dierentiated oligopoly literature to
ensure that own-price eects dominate the cross-price eects. See, for example, condition
(A.3) in Vives [22] or pp. 157 in Vives [23].
To proceed further, that is, to provide a more precise comparison between Bertrand and
Cournot for consumer surplus (or welfare), we need to compute the private rm's price
which in turn requires us to assume specic utility functions. To this end, we consider a
quadratic utility specication which gives a linear demand system. A comprehensive com-
parison between Bertrand and Cournot outcomes for linear demand systems is provided
in the next subsection.
3.4. Linear Demand. Consider the quadratic utility specication proposed in Dixit [9]
and subsequently used in Singh and Vives [19], Qiu[17], H ackner [12] and several other
papers in this literature:






where a > c, and b 2 (0;1). The goods are independent if b = 0 and perfect substitutes
if b = 1. The restriction that b lie strictly between 0 and 1 implies that the goods
are imperfect substitutes. The degree of substitutability increases, or equivalently, the
extent of product dierentiation declines, as b increases. It is easy to verify that utility
specication in (10) satises Assumptions 1|3.
The inverse demands corresponding to (10) are linear and given by
(11) p1 = a   q1   bq2; p2 = a   q2   bq1:
Inverting the inverse demands yields the direct demands:
(12) q1 =
a(1   b)   p1 + bp2
1   b2 ; q2 =
a(1   b)   p2 + bp1
1   b2 :

















i , i = f1;2g.
(D) CSC > CSB.
(E) WC < WB.
Sketch of the Proof: By Theorem 1, pC
1 < pB







i , i = f1;2g follows from Theorem 3(A). Now suppose pC
2 = pB
2 (as claimed
in part (A)). Then parts (D) and (E) immediately follow from Theorem 3(B) and 3(C)12 ARGHYA GHOSH AND MANIPUSHPAK MITRA




2 and (ii) pC
2 = pB
2.
Proof of these claims follow from routine computation and are provided in the Appendix.
Needless to say, the equality, that is, pC
2 = pB
2, is unlikely to hold for an arbitrary
number of rms.5 Underlying the equality, however, are two opposing eects which are
quite general. On the one hand, as in the standard setting, a rm's perceived elasticity of
demand is smaller under the Cournot set-up which raises pC
2.6 On the other hand, a lower
pC
1 (compared to pB
1) in our framework creates a downward pressure on the private rm's
price, which lowers pC
2. When U(q) is given by (10) these two eects oset each other,
which in turn yields pC
2 = pB
2.
For n > 2, we nd a wide range of parameter values for which pC
2 < pB
2. Together with
Theorem 1, this nding implies that for a range of parameter values, all prices, public as
well as private, are strictly lower under Cournot. See Remark 2 for details.
Remark 2. Consider an n-rm oligopoly with n1 welfare-maximizing public rms and
n2  n   n1 private rms. Then generalize the utility function as follows:















where a > m and b 2 (0;1) and each rm i = 1;2;:::;n produces exactly one variety.
The equilibrium prices in Bertrand and Cournot set-ups exhibit within-group symmetry as




2) denote the equilibrium prices charged by a
public rm and a private rm respectively in Cournot (Bertrand) competition. Similarly,
let qC
1(qB
1 ) and qC
2(qB
2 ) denote the equilibrium quantities produced by the public and private
rm respectively in Cournot (Bertrand). We nd:
(a) pC
1 = m < pB
1, sgn[pC
2   pB






The output comparisons are the same as in Theorem 2. Regarding price comparison, note
that we get pC
2 = pB
2 as in Proposition 1 (A), if n2 = 1. If n2 > 1, pC
2 < pB
2 for b 2 (0; n1 1
n 1 ).
This interval is non-empty for all n1 > 1.
That prots could be lower under Cournot competition has also been shown in H ackner
[12]. However H ackner's ndings relied on the presence of the following features: the
presence of strictly more than two rms and cost/quality asymmetry. None of these
features are present in our framework. In our framework it is the presence of public rms
5See the nding (a) in Remark 2 though, which implies that irrespective of the number of public rms, a
private rm's price is the same in Cournot and Bertrand if there is only one private rm.
6See Proposition 6.1 in Vives [23] for a comparison of elasticities under Bertrand and Cournot.COMPARING BERTRAND AND COURNOT OUTCOMES 13
that leads to the reversal of the prot and consumer surplus orderings (between Cournot
and Bertrand competition).7 These reversals also hold when the number of rms exceeds
two for a range of b 2 (0;1).
The fact that welfare reversal does not occur under linear demand structure is surpris-
ing, since Cournot seems to be more competitive according to several other indicators
of competition.8 For example, all prices are weakly lower in a Cournot duopoly. Also,





2 . Concerning welfare ordering in Proposition 1 (E) we nd that if U(q) is
given by (10), W(q) = s(q1+q2)+d(q1 q2), where s(q1+q2) = (a m)(q1+q2)  1
2(q1+q2)2
and d(q1   q2) =  
(1 b)
4 (q1   q2)2. Though s0(:) > 0, d0(:) < 0. That is, while an increase
in aggregate output increases welfare, an increase in output dierences between the two
rms decreases welfare (since both varieties enter symmetrically into the utility function).
Compared to Bertrand, q1 +q2 is higher in Cournot but q1  q2 is higher as well. It turns
out that the latter eect dominates, preserving the standard welfare ordering.
4. Bertrand versus Cournot in the Presence of Partial Privatization
In our comparison between Bertrand and Cournot outcomes, we have so far assumed
that rm 1 (i.e., the public rm) maximizes welfare. The assumption is not strictly
necessary to obtain reversals. Our results hold even when rm 1 is partially privatized.
To capture partial privatization, we modify rm 1's objective function as follows. Firm 1
maximizes R1(q;)  1(q) + (1   )W(q) under Cournot and ~ R1(p;) = ~ 1(p) + (1  
) ~ W(p) under Bertrand where  2 [0;1], and 1(q),W(q),~ 1(p) and ~ W(p) are as dened
in the previous section.9 For a welfare-maximizing public rm,  = 0. If  = 1, the public
rm is fully privatized whereas if  2 (0;1), the public rm is partially privatized. It is
easy to show that there exists ~  > 0 such that Proposition 1 (C) and (D), i.e., C
i < B
i
for i = 1;2 and CSC > CSB, holds for  < ~ .
Although the above discussion suggests that the reversal of Bertrand-Cournot ordering
can occur in the presence of a partially privatized public rm, a limitation is that the degree
of privatization, captured by the parameter , is exogenous. Consequently, the comparison
between Bertrand and Cournot implicitly assumes that the degree of privatization is the
same under the two modes of competition. This is not satisfactory since the incentives for
privatization are typically dierent for Bertrand and Cournot.
7See L opez and Naylor [13] for reversal of prot ordering in a unionized oligopoly setting.
8Although there are parameterizations such that all prices, public as well as private, are lower under
Cournot, welfare reversal does not occur under any of those parameterizations.
9Similar formulations exist in the mixed oligopoly literature with homogeneous goods. See Matsumura
[14]. Also see Fershtman [11] for a related formulation.14 ARGHYA GHOSH AND MANIPUSHPAK MITRA
To endogenize the degree of privatization we now construct a stylized two-stage game,
where a welfare-maximizing government chooses  2 [0;1] in stage 1, after which rms 1
and 2 compete in the product market in stage 2.10
4.1. The Cournot game. We consider a two-stage game. In stage 1, the social planner
chooses  2 [0;1] to maximize welfare. Given a stage 1 choice of  2 [0;1], in stage 2, rm
1 chooses q1 to maximize R1(q1;q2;) and rm 2 chooses q2 to maximize 2(q1;q2).
For any given  2 [0;1], let qC() = (qC
1();qC
2()) denote output vector in stage 2




















i ()  Pi(qC());i = 1;2. Lemma 2 records the eect of privatization on outputs
for later reference.
Lemma 2. Suppose qC
i () > 0;i = 1;2. Then
@qC
1()





When  = 0, the public rm's price equals marginal cost and hence the public rm
earns zero prots. As  increases, that is, as the weight attached to prots increases, the
public rm nds it optimal to cut back production which raises its price above marginal
cost. Lemma 2 says that indeed starting from any  = 0, the public rm's output declines
as  increases. Since outputs are strategic substitutes, the private rm's output increases
with an increase in .
Now consider the stage 1 choice of  by a welfare-maximizing government. Dene
WC() = W(qC()). Using Lemma 2 it is straightforward to establish the following:
Proposition 2. Suppose C maximizes WC(). Then C > 0.
Proof: Since W(q) is continuous in q and qC() is continuous in , WC() is continuous in
 over the compact interval  2 [0;1]. Therefore, there exists C 2 [0;1] such that WC()



















10Using the parameter  to capture the degree of privatization is simplistic. Nevertheless, this is in line
with the mixed oligopoly literature, which also uses the importance of the prot motive of the public rm
to capture the degree of privatization.COMPARING BERTRAND AND COURNOT OUTCOMES 15
We have pC
1(0) m = 0, pC
2(0) m > 0, and by Lemma 2,
@qC
2(0)
@ > 0. Then it follows from
(16) that
dWC(0)
d > 0, which in turn implies C > 0. 
The intuition for Proposition 2 is simple. Consider an innitesimally small increase in
 from  = 0. As the weight on its own prots increases, the public rm lowers its output,
q1, while the rival rm raises its output, q2. The welfare loss from a reduction in q1 is
second order since pC
1(0) m = 0 while the welfare gain from an increase in q2 is rst order
since pC
2(0) m > 0. This implies that there always exists a certain degree of privatization,
which improves welfare when the second stage game is Cournot.
Note that although government maximizes welfare, it instructs the public rm to max-
imize something dierent: a weighted sum of its prots and welfare. This idea is fa-
miliar from the strategic delegation literature where managers are given incentives (by
owners) to maximize a weighted sum of prots and sales even though the owners only
care about prots (see, for example, Vickers [21], Fershtman and Judd [10], and Sklivas
[20]). By assigning a strictly positive weight to sales in managers' incentive contracts, the
prot-maximizing owner credibly commits to a higher output which in turn raises prots.
Similarly, by assigning a strictly positive weight to prots in the public rm's objective
function, the welfare-maximizing government credibly commits to a lower output (to be
produced by the public rm) which in our framework raises welfare by partially correcting
the underproduction by the private rm.
In a Cournot duopoly with homogenous products, Matsumura [14] also found that
partial privatization can improve welfare. The key driving force behind Matsumura's
nding as well as ours is that the outputs are strategic substitutes. For partial privatization
to be strictly welfare improving in a homogeneous goods setting, either the public rm has
to be relatively inecient or the marginal cost has to be strictly increasing in output. In
our framework, product dierentiation alone, no matter how small, is sucient to generate
welfare-improving partial privatization under Cournot competition.
4.2. The Bertrand game. In stage 1, the government chooses  2 [0;1] to maximize
~ W(p). In stage 2, rm 1 chooses p1 to maximize ~ R1(p1;p2;)  ~ 1(p)+(1 ) ~ W(p) and
rm 2 chooses p2 to maximize ~ 2(p1;p2).
For any given  2 [0;1], let pB() = (pB
1();pB
2()) denote the price vector in a stage 2













1 () + (1   )(p
B
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where qB
i ()  Di(pB()), i = 1;2.
Consider an innitesimally small increase in  from  = 0. Recall that in the Cournot
game, introduction of this prot motive induced the public rm to reduce output. Simi-
larly, here, suppose the prot motive induces the public rm to raise its price, p1. Then
the private rm's price, p2, increases as well since prices are strategic complements (As-
sumption 3). Given pB
i (0) > m for both i = 1;2, a further increase in prices triggered
by partial privatization reduces welfare in Bertrand competition. While this conclusion
seems natural and holds under linear demand, note that we started with the supposition
that the introduction of the prot motive induces the public rm to raise its price, p1,
above pB
1(0). Assumptions 1|3 do not guarantee that. A sucient condition for the
supposition to hold is that the public rm produces more than the private rm in the
absence of privatization. Lemma 3 and Proposition 3 summarize our discussion.
Lemma 3. Suppose qB
i (0) > 0 and furthermore qB




@ > 0, i = 1;2.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3. Dene WB() = ~ W(pB()) = W(qB()). Now, suppose qB
i (0) > 0. Then
dWB(0)
d < 0 if qB
1 (0) > qB
2 (0).

















From rst order conditions we get
@ ~ W(pB(0))
@p1 = 0. Also, if qB





(Lemma 3). Hence it suces to show that
@ ~ W(pB(0))




































2(0) m > 0 and U22 < 0, it follows that
@ ~ W(pB(0))
@p2 < 0. 
Proposition 3 posits that small increments in  from  = 0 reduce welfare under Bertrand
competition. But what about large increments? For a linear demand system we nd that
they are not welfare improving either. Using CES preferences, Anderson et al. [2] have
shown that full privatization, that is, a change from  = 0 to  = 1, reduces welfare in
Bertrand competition. Using the standard quadratic utility specication, Proposition 4COMPARING BERTRAND AND COURNOT OUTCOMES 17
shows that not only full privatization, but no extent of privatization can improve welfare
in Bertrand competition.
4.3. Linear demand: Before stating our nding more formally, let us dene B to be
the value of  2 [0;1] that maximizes ~ WB(). Recall C denotes the optimal degree of
privatization under Cournot. Proposition 4 below compares B and C for linear demand.
Proposition 4. Suppose U(q) is given by (10). Then C 2 (0;1) while B = 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Finally, we turn to the comparison between Bertrand and Cournot outcomes in this two-
stage game with an endogenous degree of privatization. Dene C
i ()  i(qC()),B
i () 
~ i(pB())  i(qB());CSC()  CS(qC()), and CSB()  CS(qB()). As before, we
nd that the public rm's price (quantity) is strictly higher (lower) in Bertrand compe-
tition. While the private rm's price is now higher in Cournot, we still nd a reversal of
standard Bertrand-Cournot ordering for consumer surplus and prots under a range of
parameterizations.
Proposition 5. Suppose U(q) is given by (10). Then
(A) C =
b(1 b)
















1 (B) and CSC(C) > CSB(B) if b 2 (0;0:84), and nally
(F) WC(C) < WB(B).
Proof: See Appendix.
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks
The paper provides a rst systematic and comprehensive comparison between Bertrand
and Cournot outcomes in mixed markets where prot-maximizing private rms coexist
with public rms. The results, are strikingly dierent, often opposite to the ones obtained
from similar comparison in the standard setting with only prot maximizing rms. The
standard Bertrand-Cournot ranking is reversed for the public rm's price and quantity.
On the other hand, ranking reversal never occurs for the private rm's quantity. The
private rm's price can be higher or lower in Cournot. In contrast to the ndings in the
standard setting we nd that both rms earn strictly lower prots in Cournot. In addi-
tion, consumer surplus is strictly higher in Cournot competition if the demand is linear.
These results hold under a richer set-up with a partially privatized public rm, where18 ARGHYA GHOSH AND MANIPUSHPAK MITRA
the extent of privatization is endogenously determined by a welfare-maximizing govern-
ment. It is also shown that partial privatization can have dierent welfare implications
for Bertrand and Cournot competition. In particular, partial privatization (to a certain
extent) always improves welfare under Cournot competition but not necessarily so under
Bertrand competition.
Note that throughout the analysis we have assumed that the two goods are imperfect
substitutes as this is the predominant case considered in the literature. If the two goods
are complements, however, then the ranking reversals are unlikely. As before, the public
rm's price equals marginal cost in the case of Cournot competition. However, we can no
longer claim that the public rm's price is strictly lower in Cournot, since the public rm's
price is either equal to or strictly less than marginal cost under Bertrand competition. To
see why, consider an innitesimally small decline in the public rm's price from marginal
cost. This increases the public rm's output and since the two goods are complements, the
private rm's output increases as well. As there is an underproduction of the private good,
the increase in the private rm's output generates a rst order welfare gain. Therefore,
in Bertrand competition, a welfare-maximizing public rm will set its price strictly lower
than marginal cost if it is allowed to make losses, and equal to marginal cost otherwise.
6. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: If U(q) is given by (10), then under Cournot competition, the following rst







= a   q1   bq2   m = 0;
@2
@q2
= a   2q2   bq1   m = 0:




(2   b)(a   m)
2   b2 ; q
C
2 =
(1   b)(a   m)
2   b2 :
Substituting qi by q
C
i , i = 1;2 in (11) yields equilibrium prices under Cournot:
p
C
1 = m; p
C
2 = m +
(1   b)(a   m)
2   b2 :









1 b2 (i 6= j) and then solving (3) and (4) gives
p
B
1 = m +
b(1   b)(a   m)
2   b2 ; p
B
2 = m +
(1   b)(a   m)







2 b2 . Substituting pi by p
B











(1 + b)(2   b2)
:
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C()) < 0 and
@22(qC())
@q1@q2 < 0 (Assumption 2 (i)). 

































































2 ()   m =
qB









U11(qB())U22(qB()) U12(qB())U21(qB()) in (24) and then eval-

















































2 (0) > 0. By Assumption 3 (ii),
@2~ 2(pB(0))
@p2@p1 > 0. By Assumption 1 (v),
U12(qB(0))
U22(qB(0)) < 1. Since
second-order conditions are satised at p = p














U22(qB(0)) > 0. Thus all expressions in the right-hand side of (25) and (26) are strictly positive
which in turn implies
@pB
i (0)
@ > 0, i = 1;2. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Routine calculations show that, if U(q) is given by (10), then for any given




(2   b)(a   m)




(1 +    b)(a   m)















[(7   6b   2b
2 + 2b
3) + (14   10b) + 3
2](a   m)
2
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Existence of 
C follows from continuity of W
C() in  over the compact interval [0;1]. Proposition 2 gives





(2+b)3 < 0, 
C < 1. Thus 
C 2 (0;1).
The Bertrand equilibrium prices, given any stage 1 choice of , are:
p
B
1 () = m +
(1   b)(2 + b)(a   m)
(2 + 2   b2)
; p
B
2 () = m +
(1   b)(1 +  + b)(a   m)












2 ())   m(q
B
1 () + q
B




(2 + b   b
2(1   ))(a   m)




(1 +  + b)(a   m)







2(1 + b)(2 + 2   b2)2;
where f() = 7 + b   7b
2   b
3 + 2b
4 + (14   4b
2   2b
4) + 
2(3 + 7b + b
2   3b
3). Existence of 
B follows
from continuity of W
B() in  over the compact interval [0,1]. Observe that q
B









2 (0). Then applying Proposition 3 we get
dWB(0)




(2+2 b2)3 < 0 for all  2 [0;1], which implies 
B = 0. 











(2+2 b2)4 < 0 at  =
b(1 b)
(4 3b), and 
C 2 (0;1) by
Proposition 2, it follows that W







B = 0. This proves (A).
Using 
B and 
C it is quite easy to verify that p
B
1 (
















C) = m +
2(1 b)(a m)






































(4 3b2) . Result (C)


















In what follows we prove (D), (E) and (F). Using the values of q
C
i (), i = 1;2 from the proof of



















2(4 3b2) . Since 






B), i = 1;2 are same as in the proof of Lemma 2.



















2(1+b)(2 b2)2 . We now compare Bertrand and Cournot outcomes. It is easy








(1+b)(2 b2)2(4 3b2)2 < 0 8 b 2 (0;1) which proves (D).















2(1+b)(2 b2)2(4 3b2) , which is
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